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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE BO,iVERY SAVINGS BANK,
a corporation,
Plaintif!-Respondent,
.vs.

LYNN A. JENI\:INS and LINDA M.
JENKINS, his wife,

Case No .
12903

Defendants-A ppeUants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action to foreclose a note and mortgage
brought by the mortgagee after tenders of all payments <lue under the note and mortgage had been rejected by the mortgagee.
DISPOSITION OF CASE
BY LO\VER COURT
The lower court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment and entered Judgment in the
amount of $15,932.97, and ordered the mortgage foreclosed and the property sold to satisfy the Judgment.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Summary Judgment should be set aside and
Judgment should be entered in favor of DefendantsA ppellants dismissing the Complaint, or, in the alternative, the case should be remanded for trial.
STATEMENT OF :FACTS
In November of 1970, LYNN A. JENKINS
("JENKINS") purchased the property at 4711 Westpoiut Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, from Thomas L.
lloopiiaina, hy agreeing, among other things, to assume
the mortgage against the property in favor of Johnson.Anderson l\Iortgage Company ("JOHNSON-ANDERSON") ( R.5;3) This mortgage had been assigned
by .TOIINSON-ANDERSON to THE BO,VERY
S.AVINGS BANK ("BANK") in New York City,
but JOHN SON-ANDEHSON was still servicing that
mortgage as agent for the
(R.33) JENKINS
paid to .JOHNSON-ANDERSON all payments which
·were delinquent at that time and requested whatever was
necessary to transfer the Joan to his name. (R.55)
In December of 1970, JENKINS sold the prop·
erty under contract to Clyde B. and Darlene S. Andrus,
who went into possession and have remained there ever
since. In .May of 1971, JENKINS transferred his in·
terest in the property and his seller's interest in the An·
drus contract to Vernal E. and Hazel J. Peterson.
Copies of the deed to Petersons, the contract to An·
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druses and an Assignment of Trust Funds to Petersons
were sent to JOHNSON-ANDERSON. Mr. Joe
Dugger of JOHNSON-ANDERSON was told by
JENKINS that JE.NKINS from then on would only
be acting as escrow agent to service the contract for
Petersons and that he woulrl forward the mortgage payments to JOHNSON-ANDERSON as the contract
payments were received from Andrus. (R.55-56).
JENKINS received the June, rnn, contract payment from Andrus in July and forwarded the mortgage
payment of $129.00, plus a late charge of $2.56 to
JOHNSON-..itNDERSON. This was returned to
JEN KINS on .July 26, 1971, with a notation that it
was not su f ficicnt to pay the June and July payments.
As soon as JENKINS received the next contract payment from Andrus, he forwarded a check for two
monthly payments and two late charges to JOHNSONAND EHSON. This too was returned to him with a
notation that it was not sufficient because the August
payment was now due. JENKINS received this back
on August 20, rnn, and telephoned Joe Dugger and
e\':plainccl that Andrus had been out of work because
of a strike, but that the next payment was expected soon.
'l'hat payment was received by JENKINS in September. .J ENKIXS immediately hand carried $394.68 to
JOHNSON-ANDERSON. This amount was also
later returned to .JENKINS. (R. 25, 56).
JENKINS then, on September 23, 1971, teleof JOHNSON-ANDERSON and
phoned Joe Durrfl'er
00
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statecl that he would send over $526.24 to cover all payments due through September, including late charges
for each month. Dugger said he would not accept these
payments because they wanted the property Lack.
JENKINS then asked for the name of Dugger's irn1rediate supervisor. He was given the name of Phil Al·
hertso11 in Denver, Colorado. JENKINS then called
Albertson in Denver, who refused to accept the money
all(l also refused to give the name of anyone at the
RCHVERY SAYINGS llANK in New York. .JENKINS called the BANK in New York and talked with
l\I r. Frank Abbey, who told JENKINS to send the
payments to him. JENKINS thereupon sent the
$526.24 to Abbey in New York along with copies of
the other papers previously supplied to JOH:\T"SON·
ANDEHSON. This money was also later returned to
.JENKINS. (R. 25-26, !56-57).
In the meantime, the Complaint \Vas filed in this
case on September 24, H)7J, but was not served on
JENKINS until October 4, H>71; JENKINS filed an
Answer to the Complaint based upon the several tenders
whieh ha cl been made and also paid into Court all of the
allegedly past due installmeuts. Additional payments
were made into Court each month as the monthly install·
ments were due. The Plaintiff then filed a l\Iotion for
Summary .Judgment which was granted by the lower
Court based upon findings that there was no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that Plaintiff had declared the entire balance due on the note and mortgage
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prior to the tender to Plaintiff of $526.24. (R. 69, 72).
This appeal resulted.
ARGUl\IENT

I.
THE COURT EHRED IN GRANTING
.JUDGMENT SINCE THERE IS
A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO
'VHETHER T E N D E R OF THE FULL
A:\IOUNT DUE UNDER THE NOTE AND
MORTGAGE HAD BEEN l\IADE PRIOR TO
ACCELERATION AND INSTITUTION OF
THE LA 'VSUIT.
Rule 5() ( c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that Summary Judgment may be rendered only
if all of the documents on file show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact. Therefore, all of
the evidence on file must be viewed in favor of JENI\ !XS arnl should any material fact be in dispute, the
Summary Judgment must be reversed. Hatch v. Sugar·
house F'inance CompanlJ, 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P.2d 758
(1067); In re JVilliams Estate, IO Utah 2d 83, 348

r .2a 683 ( moo) .

The Affidavit of Joe Dugger of JOHNSONANDERSON claims that no tender of the full amount
due was made by JEXKINS prior to the institution of
the lawsuit ( R. 34). The Answers to Interrogatories
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cmhmitted hy JENKI.:\1"S (R. 25-26) and the Affidavit
in Opposition to l\Iotion for Summary Judgment (H.
·t7-+8) and documents attached thereto (R. 55-57) all
state that full tenders were made prior to the institution of the la.wsuit to three separate agents of the Plaintiff and that the tender was in fact accepted by the
BANK ia New York. These contrary claims present a
disputed fact which should be resolved prior to any
judgment. The Summary .T udgment was therefore im·
proper and should be reversed.

II.
TENDER OF THE F'ULL Al\IOUNT DUE
PHIOR TO ACCELERATION OF THE NOTE
AND l\lORTGAGE PREVENTS FORECLOSURE.
Uoth the note and the mortgage contain provisions
with respect to the acceleration of the balance due. These
lH'm'isions must be read together and in fact, constitute
one contruct since they were executed at the same time
and in the course of the same transaction. A mcrican
b'avi11gs & Loan Association ·vs. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d
280, 445 P .2<l 1, 4 ( 1968) . The note provides that the
failure to cure a default hy the due date of the next
installment gfres the holder of the note the option to
accelerate the entire principal and accrued interest.
( R. 5). The mortgage provides that "if default be made
in the payment of the said note or of any monthly in·
stallment of principal and interest as therein provided
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... then the mortgagee may declare the entire indebtedness due and foreclose the mortgage." (R. n). Read
together, these provisions require the holder to give
notiee of any acceleration of the note and mortgage.
S11lli'1. an tis. Shannon, 25 Cal.App.2<l 422, 77 P.2d 498
( 10:38) ; Annotation, 5 A.L.R. 2<l !)68 §§ 3, 4. The
words "without notice" in the note do not change this
interpretation since some affirmative act must be taken
by the holder to api>rise the maker of the exercise of the
option. Carmichael v. Hice, 49 N.:M. 114, 158 P.2d 290,
202 ( HH5). In this case there is no indication in the
record that any act was taken to apprise JENKINS
or any other party of acceleration prior to the institution of the foreclosure action and service of Summons
on JENKIXS.
It is admitted that the service of foreclosure papers
on .TEN KINS is notice of acceleration. However, several tenders of the full amount due had been made to
the BANK or its agents prior to that time. The record
shows that full tc:ncler was made to :Mr. Dugger of
JOH
by telephone, to l\Ir.
Albertson of JOHNSON-ANDERSON by telephone,
and to l\Ir. Abbey of the
both by telephone and
by mail. .All of these tenders took place on September
:!3, Hl71, which was one day prior to the filing of the
Complaint and eleven days prior to the service of Summons which would haYe accelerated the balance due.
The tender to l\Ir. Abbey in New York was in fact accepted when he told JENKINS to forward the payments to him. The commencement of foreclosure after
1
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this acceptance was irnprnper and should be grounds for
the dismissal of the foreclosure action.
The case of Romero v. Schmidt, L3 Utah 2d 300
:rn:! P .:!d :n ( 1 f)()4) was very similar to the case now
before the Court. There an attempt was made to foreclose a Uniform Heal Estate Contract as a note and
rnortgage after a tender of full payment was made by
telepho11e hy the Defen<lant's broker. All delinquent
payrnen ts were to he paid from money held in trust by
the hroker. The court held that those facts were snffi·
cient to constitute a tender even though they didn't meet
the strict legal requirements of a tender. Under the cir·
cumstanccs a strict legal tender would have been a
"meaningless gesture." The effect of the tender was to
pre,·e11t the foreclosure. Those same facts are present in
the i11stant case, except that here we have a note and
mortgage, illstcacl of a U11iform Real Estate Contract,
which should make no clifference. Therefore, the three
tenders by tclepho11e and the one in writing should
viously meet even the legal requirements of a tender and
prevent foreclosure.
I

",:\.cloption of this co11struction lends itself to
the general principles of equity and the attitude
this arnl other courts luwe taken toward rnort·
gage foreclosures. The Plaintiff will sustain
hv
the court's refusing to enforce
no dam:we
l'>
•
the acceleration clause since he will receive the
full
he bargained for . · ·"
(Romero v. Schmidt, supra.)
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III.
THIS CASE SHOULD IlE DISl\IISSED
FOR FAILUHE TO JOIN THE TITLE HOLDERS A"ND THOSE IN POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY AS INDISPENSABLE PAR-

TIES.

In attempting. to foreclose against the property
subject to its mortgage, the BANK has failed to join
the Petersons, who hold the legal title to the property
and the Andrnses, who are purchasing the property under contract and are in possession of the property. These
parties are, of course, those whose rights are most
seriously effected by the foreclosure action. The
BAXK attempts to justify this failure by relying on
§ 78-37-3 U.C.A., providing that parties with unrecorde<l interests need not be made parties to the foreclosure
proeee<lings. This statute must be read in light of § 57u; U.C.A., providing that a conveyance of real property must be recorded to operate as notice to third parties hut sha 11 nevertheless be valid and binding between
the parties thereto "and to all other persons who have
had adual notice." The BANK, in this case, had actual
notice of the interests of Petersons and Andruses.
Copies of the deed to Petersons and the contract to Andruscs were sent to JOHNSON-ANDERSON and also
to the BANK. (R 47). In fact, JOHNSON-ANDERSON has communicated with the Andruses by
letters dated August 16, rn71, and June 30, 1971, (R.
47, 53, 54), prior to the commencement of foreclosure
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proceedings. The actual notice of these interests to the
K or its agent cannot be denied.
"rhen the ah<we statutes are read together, the
vious interpretation requires the mortgagee to join all
interested parties of whom it had notice, either by re·
cording, possession or actual notice to it. Especially is
tliis true where the interested parties of whom the mart·
gagce has notice are those whose interests are most seri·
ously effected hy the foreclosure proceedings, as are
those of the Pctcrsons and Andruses in this case. A
California court confronted with statutes substantially
identical to § 78-H7-3 arnl § 57-1-6 U.C.A., found that
the latter took precedence OYer the former where the
mortgagee had actual notice of an unrecorded interest
before commencement of a foreclosure suit. In Joh11·
son v. 11 mnc 01cners' Loan Corporation, 4G Cal.App.
2d 54G, 1 Hi P .id, 1 G7 ( l!H l), the suit was brought to
set aside a real estate foreclosure decree and sale thereunder, entered in an action where pers1ms claiming title
were not 111ade parties. The Court held that the suit to
set aside the decree was proper where the mortgagee
had actual notice of the interests of those 'rho were
clai111ing title to the property and were in possession of
the property awl "·ere not made patties to the foreclosure action. Likewise, § 57-1-G shoulcl take precedence
over § 78-:37-H and require the BANK to make all per·
sons with an interest in the property, of whom it baa
notice, parties to this action in order to effectively foreclose its mortgage. Comparison should be made w1'th the
Utah case of Federal Land Banlc of Berkeley v. Pace,
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87 Utah 15G, 48 P.2d 480 (1935), where the court held
that a foreclosure action was not binding on the grantee
of the property who was not a party to the foreclosure
action.
In preparing foreclosure reports in Utah, title examiners uniformly check and report on the occupancy
of the property to he foreclosed. This practice results
from the fact that possession serves as constructive
notice of the possessor's interest in the property. Had
this practice been followed in this case, possession by the
.An<lruses awl the interests of the Peterons would have
been reYealed, eYen though already known to the BANK.
One in possession is usually considered a necessary party
to a foreclosure action and a decree of foreclosure is
not effective as to him unless he is joined. 55 Am.Jur.
2d l\Iortgages § 57 4.
The BANK's failure to join the owners of this
property ns parties to this action renders any decree of
foreclosure and order of sale void and of no effect. In
,l[icl,.clson v. Anderson, 81 Utah 444, 19 P.2d 1033,
103() ( I na2) , the court held a foreclosure void as to all
the parties because the title cwner was omitted in the
original foreclosure suit. The court stated:
"The foreclosure and sale were ineffectual to
convey any title to respondent, the purchaser
at such sale, because the only person who had
any title to the property was inadvertently
overlooked and not made a party to the suit
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.... The sale hy the Sheriff could be effective
in conveying ouly the right, title and interest
which the parties defendant in that suit had in
the mortgaged property, but nothing more.
Such parties had no interest in the real estate
each, before suit, having conveyed the property'
by warranty deed. Thus, no interest in the
realty was vested in the purchaser by the
Sheriff's sale . . . .
. . . Hespondent, while seeking to foreclose her
mortgage in the first action, failed to effect a
foreclosure because the owner of the property
was not a party to the action; hence the decree
of foreclosure was void and of no effect as
such."
The reasoning of this case becomes even more per·
suasive where the mortgagee knows of the interests of
other parties who have not been joined. In followingthi
1Jlickclson case this court stated in II oyt v. Upper Mar
ion Ditch Co., !)4 Utah 134, 76 P.2d 234, 240 (1938),
an<l in Header t'. District Court of Fourth Judicial
trict, 98 Utah 1, !>4 P.2d 858, 8Hl, (1939). "Thiscasi
would seem fairlv conclusive that where a pledgee or
subpledgee fails
join a known owner, the Judgmenl
is void and must be set aside." (emphasis added). Fol·
lowing these eases, this court should hold that the failurf
of the B.. ANK to join the Petersons and Andruses ai
indispensable parties renders the decree of foreclosuri
void as to all parties.

to
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CONCLUSION
The cases and statutes clearly indicate that any
decree of foreclosure and sale of the property would
be void awl of no effeet because of the failure to join
the actual owners of the property in the foreclosure proceedings. Those persons whose interests are most seriously effected by the foreclosure, the present owners of
the property, are indispensable to a fair and proper determillation of this matter. The decree should be reversed and the Complaint dismissed on this ground
alone. However, the several tenders of the full amount
due prior to acceleration of the balance due on the note
and mortgage, and the actual acceptance of one of those
tenders, precludes any foreclosure by the mortgagee.
The written tender met the strict legal requirements of
a tender aml the other tenders by telephone are sufficient
to prevent foreclosure since they were refused, making
any further tender a meaningless gesture. All of these
facts are clear from the record and justify a Judgment
in favor of Appellants. Yet, at the very least, there
exists a genuine issue as to whether tender was actually
made. That is a material fact. Therefore, since a material fact remains in dispute, Summary Judgment is not
appropriate and the case should be remanded for trial
or other further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted:
BACKMAN, BACK1\1AN &
CLARK
BY: RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ.

